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EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, AND "THIS KIND OF
SPEECH": A HERETICAL
PERSPECT~VE ON HUSTLER
MAGAZINE V. FALWELL
PAUL

A.

LEBEL'"

In August 1986, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed a $200,000 judgment for the Reverend
Jerry Falwell on his claim against Hustler Magazine and its publisher,
Larry Flynt, for the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 1 The lawsuit arose out of the publication of an "ad parody,"
published in the November 1983 and March 1984 issues of Hustler,
purporting to contain an interview with plaintiff Falwell in which he
recounted, among other things, escapades such as sexual relations with
his mother in an outhouse and drunkenness. 2 Falwell had been unsuccessful on two other tort claims arising out of the same incident: the
jury found against Falwell on a libel claim, 3 and an invasion of privacy
claim had been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff's claim did
not fall within the scope of the limited invasion of privacy tort action
for appropriation of a person's name or likeness that Virginia state law
recognized. 4
• Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. Work on this article was assisted by a research grant from the Marshall-Wythe Law School Foundation. The author wishes to thank Frederick
Schauer and Rodney Smolla for their comments on the article. The author is also grateful to Alexander
Wellford and David Kohler, of the Richmond, Virginia firm of Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent & Chappell, who acted as counsel for various amici in the Falwell case, for the opportunity to participate in a
"moot court" session with the Hustler/Flynt attorneys prior to the Supreme Court argument. That
exposure heightened the author's appreciation of the issues in Falwell, but in no way reduced his
amazement at the result.
I. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, reh'g and reh'g en bane denied, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). Falwell had also sued Flynt Distributing Company, the magazine's distributor, but the jury returned a verdict for that defendant. [d.
2. [d. at 1272.
3. The jury concluded that "no reasonable man would believe that the parody was describing
actual facts about Falwell." [d. at 1273. The significance of this finding is discussed infra notes 105-06
and accompanying text.
4. Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1273. Restrictively interpreting the Virginia "appropriation of name or
likeness" statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1984), the district court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on
the basis that the appropriation of Falwell's name "was not for purposes of trade within the meaning of
the statute." 797 F.2d at 1273. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that dismissal, adding as another ground
for the decision the adoption of a new requirement for finding liability. To find liability under this
requirement, the use of a public figure's name "must take such a form that the reader would reasonably
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Despite the United States Supreme Court's reversal of the
Fourth Circuit's decision in favor of Falwell, 5 the Court has not satisfactorily addressed many of the most significant legal issues that were
raised by the dispute. The issues presented to the Court were, first,
whether the first amendment places constraints on a state's tort law
permitting the recovery of damages for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and second, if the first amendment does so, what is
the nature of those constitutional constraints. 6
The Court instead appeared to be distracted by a hypothetical
question along the lines of whether a publisher such as The Washington Post should be liable for the emotional discomfort of a public figure
intentionally caused by a publication such as a Herblock editorial cartoon. 7 Stating that he could find no principled basis on which to distinguish a case of that sort from the case that was actually before the
Court,S Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for seven of the Justices,9
concluded that Falwell could not maintain an action for damages for
the intentional infliction of emotional distress without proof that a
•

believe the falsification." Id. at 1278. Given the jury's finding that such a belief was not reasonable,
supra note 3, Falwell's invasion of privacy claim failed to satisfy this new test.
S. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S.Ct. 876 (1988).
6. The Court's opinion stated:
We must decide whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused
by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in
the eyes of most. Respondent would have us find that a State's interest in protecting public
figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech
that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury.
Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
As this article demonstrates, there is an important distinction between deciding that the tort claim
at issue on appeal is subject to some first amendment restrictions and deciding that the constitutional
protections developed in the defamation context should be transferred virtually intact to this very different setting. See generally part II, infra.
7. The Chief Justice's opinion traces the history and remarks favorably on the importance of
political cartooning. 108 S. Ct. at 881. That history is set out in an amicus brief filed on behalf of The
Association of American Editorial Cartoonists. The jeopardy in which political cartooning is alleged to
have been placed by the judgment for Falwell is described in that brief, Brief for Amicus Curiae, The
Association of American Editorial Cartoonists at 20-30, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876
(1988), as well as in Judge Wilkinson's opinion dissenting from the Fourth Circuit's denial of rehearing
en bane, Falwell v. Flynt, 80S F.2d 484, 487 (4th Cir. 1986).
8. 108 S. Ct. at 881 (expressing doubt that there is "a principled standard" to separate the publication in the Falwell case from "more traditional political cartoons").
9. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the Falwell decision. Justice White concurred in the
judgment, in a cryptic opinion in which he agreed that liability could not "be squared with the First
Amendment." Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring in judgment). He did not, however, explain his reasons
for that conclusion. For a discussion of Justice White's concurring opinion, see infra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text.
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false statement of fact had been made with "actual malice,"IO and accordingly set aside the lower court judgment in Falwell's favor. II
Unable to offer any convincing general characterization of what
sort of speech the Court had before it, the Chief Justice's opinion referred vaguely, and not very helpfully, to the nondefamatory references to Falwell as "publications such as the one here at issue."12 The
opinion also too lightly dismissed the defendant's conduct as involving
simply "the publication of an ad parody offensive to"13 the plaintiff.
In failing to convey an understanding of the precise issue, the Court
was unable to provide much in the Way of guidance for the conduct of
future litigation, other than a fact-specific rejection of liability imposed
on some indeterminate category of "this kind of speech." 14
This article examines the relationship between the tort of the intentional iQ.fliction of emotional distress and the first amendment, and
concludes that the emotional distress tort claim should retain a more
expanded role than the Supreme Court's Falwell decision appears to
leave it. The route to such a conclusion requires tracing state tort law
as it has been constitutionalized in other free-speech contexts and
identifying the significant differences between the other torts that are
restricted by the first amendment and the emotional distress tort claim
asserted by Falwell. The article will offer an alternative method of
constitutionalizing the emotional distress tort that adequately protects
first amendment interests without resorting to the Falwell case's denigration of the importance or the legitimacy of the personal interests
protected by this tort action.
This article could be subtitled a concurring rather than a dissenting opinion. It reflects the author's judgment that, applying, the ele10. 108 S. Ct. at 882. The term "actual malice" refers to the publisher's state of mind of either
knowing that the publication is false or displaying reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. See New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Taken from the context of constitutionallimitations on liability for defamation, the term here was applied in such a way as to add to the emotional
distress tort a requirement that the publication alleged to have caused such distress must contain a
false statement of fact about which the "actual malice" could be entertained. For a critical discussion
of the way in which this application results in a distortion of the tort claim before the Court, see infra
notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
II. 108 S. Ct. at 883. The Court concluded that Falwell's claim could not, consistent "with the
First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here." [d.
12. [d. at 882 (emphasis added). The Court also referred to the publication before it as "an
offensive publication," id. at 880, and "a caricature such as the ad parody involved here," id. at 883. As
this article explains, the Court was on the right track in its references to "debate about public affairs,"
id. at 880, and "public debate about public figures," id. at 881.
13. [d. at 879.
14. The phrase "this kind of speech" is not actually used by the Court, but has been chosen by the
author to capture the fact-specificity of the Court's opinion. The closest the Court comes to the phrase
is the reference to "the sort of expression involved in this case." [d. at 882.
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ments of this constitutionally acceptable emotional distress tort to the
Falwell facts, the plaintiff's victory in the lower courts could not be
allowed to stand. The Court's flawed or incomplete reasoning in
reaching the proper result should not preclude further attention to the
relationship between the first amendment and the emotional distress
action. It is particularly important for the decision of later cases that
the ambiguities and uncertainties generated by the Court's Falwell
opinion be replaced with a clear understanding not only of why the
decision in that case was correct, but also of what room remains for
the successful assertion of the emotional distress claim.
The title's characterization of the perspective adopted in this article as "heretical" stems from the author's sense that there is an orthodoxy in libel law practice and scholarship today. Its proponents
zealously protect media interests and are quick to denounce departures from the true faith as "anti-first amendment."ls They seem
never to have encountered an absolute privilege they didn't like, nor a
qualified privilege that shouldn't be extended. The harm inflicted by
speech is seldom regarded by the orthodox view as significant enough
to warrant compensation. Indeed, any prospect of tort liability is seen
as an intolerable threat to first amendment values. Given the Chief
Justice's previous position as one of the principal opponents of this
conventional view,16 it is ironic that the opinion for the Court in
Falwell serves as something of a model of orthodox thinking about
whether, and if so, how, the first amendment ought to affect novel
issues.
This article admittedly comes at the issues presented by Falwell
from a perspective different from the contemporary mainstream. Its
author, however, would resist the suggestion that his "heretical" views
on' how the first amendment places limits on tort claims necessarily
makes him an apostate from the belief in the importance of freedom of
15. For reactions to this view, see LeBel, The Good. The Bad. and The Press (Book Review), 1986
DUKE LJ. \074. See generally Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 COR·
NELL L. REV. 302 (1984); Nagel, How to Stop Libel Suits and Still Protect Individual Reputation,
WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1985, at 12.
16. See. e.g.. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from decision requiring courts to apply clear and convincing evidence standard of proof to motions for
summary judgment in cases to which that standard applies); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1984) (opinion by Rehnquist, J., noting the state's interest in protecting its citizens from the
deception caused by defamatory statements); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (opinion by
Rehnquist, J., applying test of public figure status and clarifying the fact that reputational injury is not
a prerequisite to recovery for defamation).
The fact that the decision in Falwell was written by the Chief Justice might produce either skepti·
cism or amazement at an apparent conversion. Resistance to the temptation to adopt a skeptical atti·
tude is suggested in Smolla, Emotional Distress and The First Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v.
Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 438 (1988).
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speech. Instead, as described below, the "heresy" consists of the belief
that harm caused by speech is not necessarily less serious and less deserving of compensation than harm caused in other ways and that
speech interests do not always outweigh the individual interests of victims of harmful speech. The protection of individual interests should
be accommodated with first amendment values whenever it is possible
to do so.
The celebrity of the parties to the Falwell litigation and the obnoxiousness of their conduct on this and other occasions,17 as well as
the temptation to portray the litigation as a momentous cultural battle,18 create a risk of obscuring the essential simplicity of the Falwell
case. An understanding of what was at stake in this litigation can be
derived from a consideration of three questions. First, should a tort
plaintiff be able to evade the constitutional restrictions imposed on liability for defamation by attaching the label of a different tort theory to
the same course of conduct that would have supported a defamation
claim? Second, if the answer to the first question is in the negative,
should the constitutional restrictions on recovery for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress be transferred intact from the current
law of defamation? Third, if the second question is answered in the
negative, what sort of constitutional limits on the emotional distress
action are appropriate?
Part I of this article will consider the first two questions, showing'
that a negative answer is the only plausible conclusion. The critical
question then becomes what constitutional restrictions ought to be imposed on the ability to obtain a tort recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Part II of the article examines the answers
to that question offered by the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court
in Falwell and explains why each of those answers is considerably less
than compelling. In part III, the article will set out a scheme of constitutional protection for those whose speech is subject to attack under
the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort theory. That project will consist of three steps: first,· outlining the moral basis for imposing liability for the kind of tortious conduct that can be
characterized as the intentional infliction of emotional distress; second, explaining how this (admittedly wide-sweeping) moral notion can
17, A few years ago, the author referred to the Falwell/Flynt litigation 'IS the legal equivalent of
the Army·Navy game, to which the only reasonable response is to wish for each team to suffer a
humiliating defeat LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the Publication of Fiction: Fashioning a
Theory of Liability, 51 BROOKLYN L REV, 281, 306 n,96 (1985), Perhaps the more contemporary
analogy would have been the Iran·Iraq war,
18, See R, SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V, LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL
24·27 (1988).
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be incorporated into the existing structure of the intentional emotional
distress action; and third, identifying the elements of the tort action
that lend themselves to serving as the hooks upon which can be hung a
carefully-tailored constitutional protection from liability for this tort.
I.

EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION INTO A NEW
TORT ARENA

Recognition of an action for the recovery of damages for emotional distress distinct from compensation for a physical injury has
developed largely by indirection and fairly arbitrary line drawing. Citing concerns about fraudulent claims, a flood of administratively difficult cases, and liability greatly disproportionate to culpability, courts
have routinely insisted on the satisfaction of some tangible or readily
identifiable prerequisite to the recovery for emotional distress. 19
Viewed from the long-term perspective of the development of common
law emotional distress actions, the Supreme Court's Falwell foray into
the emotional distress field is simply another inadequate attempt to
create barriers to recovery, although on this occasion the rationales for
those barriers are matters of constitutional significance rather than
nonconstitutional policy concerns.
The modern and most widely adopted version of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was published in 1948 as a supplement to the Restatement of Torts.20 In its standard, recognized
form,21 and as adopted in Virginia,22 the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort action requires the plaintiff to prove four major
elements:
first, that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;23
19. The arbitrariness of the lines drawn at different stages in the development of a negligent infliction of emotional distress tort is traced in Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted
Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982).
20. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 46 (Supp. 1948): "One who, without a privilege to do so,
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b)
for bodily harm resulting from it." Prior to the adoption of that amendment, the Restatement restricted recovery either to a situation that would be covered by a traditional intentional tort action, or
to one that would constitute the negligent infliction of bodily harm as a result of an intentional interference with mental tranquility. See generally State Rubbish. Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952). The history and the paradigmatic applications of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort are described in Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits
of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 42 (1982).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Unless specified otherwise, subsequent
references in the text and in the footnotes to the "RESTATEMENT" are to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS (1965, 1977, 1979).
22. See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
23. To avoid any ambiguity, the intent element of this tort claim should be interpreted as requir-
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second, that the defendant's conduct can be characterized as ex-

treme and outrageous;24
third, that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the
harm that the plaintiff suffered;25 and
fourth, that the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. 26
The relationship between the general category of conduct addressed by the emotional distress action and the kind of activity protected as part of the relevant first amendment freedoms frequently is
fairly close. Unlike the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which usually is tied to the creation of a risk of physical injury to
the plaintiff27 or to a third party,2s the elements of the intentional emotional distress claim typically are satisfied by activity that is either exclusively or predominantly speech.29 For example, a claim for relief
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has been recognized
in situations in which a defendant has communicated threats to the
plaintiff,30 has insulted the plaintiff,31 or has accomplished both in one
communication.32 Communications involving debt collection 33 or sexing an intent to cause severe emotional distress, or recklessness with regard to that distress. Subsequent
references in the text and the footnotes to the "intent" element of this tort claim are to be understood to
include recklessness, unless otherwise specified. Proof of intent or recklessness is discussed infra notes
74-76 and accompanying text.
24. The language in the text is from the RESTATEMENT, supra note 21. The Virginia version of
this element of the tort claim states that "the conduct was outrageous and intolerable in that it offends
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Womack, 215 Va. at 342, 210
S.E.2d at 148.
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21.
26. [d.
27. Emotional distress as a result of being within the zone of danger of physical injury from the
defendant's conduct is one of the more commonly recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress
actions. See, e.g., Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
28. Bystander recovery by a plaintiff who was not herself subjected to the risk of physical injury
from defendant's conduct has been recognized in cases such as Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
29. One could attempt to distinguish speech from conduct, and then limit the scope of the emotional distress tort claim to the latter category. The difficulty of drawing that distinction in a meaningful and manageable fashion, ,as well as the presence of both elements in most situations, suggest that the
exercise is not worth the effort. See Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Serv. v. Missouri Real
Estate Comm'n, 712 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1986) (disagreement between majority and dissent about use of
speech/conduct distinction).
30. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (plaintiff was
told to accede to union demands or face beating and damage to his property). See generally Pearson,
supra note 19.
31. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So: 2d 396 (Fla. 1958) (plaintiff was told "you stink to me"
by defendant's employee).'
32. Lipman v. Atlantic Coast LineR.R., 108 S.c. 151,93 S.E. 714 (1917).
33. Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 CaL App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571 (1950) (defendant placed a purported emergency telephone call to plaintift).
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ual solicitation 34 or both 35 have also served as the basis of emotional
distress claims. Practical jokes at the expense of the plaintiff constitute
another category of communications that can support an emotional
distress claim. 36
The speech foundation of many, if not most, intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims might lead to an initial assumption that all
such claims should be subjected to constitutional restrictions. However, a consideration of a distinction in the kinds of speech that can
produce emotional distress provides a preliminary classificatory device
of some utility. The intentional infliction of emotional distress typically involves communication of something to the plaintiff. 37 The kind
of conduct involved in the Falwell case presents the different matter of
a communication about the plaintiff. In deciding that the constitution
places limits on liability for tort claims based on theories of defamation 38 and invasion of privacy,39 the Supreme Court has had before it
only cases involving speech that is primarily about the plaintiff. ' This
is because the principal tort claims on which the Court had imposed
constitutional limitations each contained an element requiring communication to someone other than the tort plaintiff. 40
The distinction between speech-to and speech-about can be employed as the first step in devising a way to determine whether the
constitutional protection of freedom of speech should restrict tort liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Restrictions
could be conditioned on a threshold showing that something more
than speech-to the plaintiff was involved. That threshold would introduce into the emotional distress claim an element similar to the publi34. Samms v. Eccles, II Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (repeated telephone calls to plaintiff,
plus one incident of indecent exposure).
35. Oigsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 47 S.E.2d 203 (1948) (offer by debt collector
to let plaintiff "take it out in trade").
36. Wilkinson v. Oownton, 2 Q.B. 57 (1897) (false report that plaintiirs husband had been seriously injured in accident).
37. See supra notes 30-36.
38. See generally LeBel, Reforming the Tort of Defamation: An Accommodation of the Competing
Interests Within the Current Constitutional Framework, 66 NEB. L. REV. 249, 252-87 (1987) (summary
of the constitutional restrictions on recovery for defamation).
39. See. e.g.• Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
40. The defamation actions for libel ·and slander each require proof of publication, which in the
defamation context is a term of art meaning communication of the defamatory statement to someone
other than the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of TORTS § 577 (1977). The invasion of privacy
torts for placing the plaintiff in a false light and for the public disclosure of private facts each requires
proof of a more extensive publication element that the RESTATEMENT refers to as "publicity." Id. at
§§ 6520, 652E. According to the RESTATEMENT, publicity "means that the matter is made public, by
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." Id. at § 6520 comment a.
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cation element of the defamation and invasion of privacy torts. A
failure to cross that threshold would indicate that a particular emotional distress claim was distinguishable enough from the other constitutionalized speech torts that constitutional protectiori would not have
to be afforded the activity causing the emotional distress. In the case
of pure speech-to, that is, speech that does not reach an audience beyond the person to whom it is directed, the "public debate" rationale
for the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 41 would not be
implicated, thus leaving the proponent of first amendment protection
with the burden of providing a plausible alternative reason to impose
constitutional limitations on liability.42
As with many supposedly bright-line demarcations between categories of cases, the speech-to and speech-about characterizations may
be both weaker and stronger than they initially appear to be. The distinction would leave unaffected the tort law precedents in such cases as
bill collector harassment or practical jokes of the false-report-of-aninjury-to-a-relative ilk. Even those speech-to fact patterns, however,
are easily susceptible to a modification that brings them within the
scope of the speech-about characterization. When the collection
agency calls the plaintitrs place of employment, for example, an implicit negative message about the plaintiff can be conveyed. Similarly,
the plaintiff whose humiliation in the course of a practical joke occurs
in public is someone about whom a negative message has at least implicitly been conveyed.
Because speech to a person may have incidental affects that reach
a wider audience, the application of any guideline based on the distinction between speech-to and speech-about may very well have to focus
on the primary thrust of the communication. Furthermore, a communication that primarily is speech about a person may reach that person, as was the case of the publication in Hustler which was brought to
Falwell's attention. 43 As long as the limited utility of the speech-tol
speech-about dichotomy is acknowledged, however, it can serve as a
useful way to remove from constitutional scrutiny at least some tortious conduct traditionally subject to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
41. 376 U.s. 254, 270 (1964) (declaring "a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
42. The use of other free speech rationales for this purpose is illustrated in R. SMOLLA, supra note
18. The weakness in those other rationales is related to their inability to identify some unique property
of speech that identifies it as entitled to special protection from legal responsibility for the harm that it
causes to another person. See generally F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A .PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
(1982).
43. See R. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 1.
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Assuming that a communication that is primarily speech-to is
treated as raising no substantial constitutional problems,44 the more
significant question is whether speech-about is always subject to constitutional protection. As long as it is understood that an affirmative
answer to that question does not necessarily commit one to any particular regime of protection, a consideration of the implications of a negative answer should make it clear that the affirmative answer is
correct.
A hallmark of the common law pleading systems from which
contemporary law has evolved was a hypertechnical insistence on the
selection of just the right writ and the use of precisely the right language with which to plead and prove one's case. 45 The question of
whether a plaintiff should be entitled to recover was sometimes treated
as secondary to the question of whether the plaintiff exercised the correct options in the pleading stage of the litigation. 46 In such a system,
a party who deserved compensation could be denied any recovery simply because of improper pleading technique.
Modern procedural rules for civil actions are more in tune with
common sense and fairness in attaching less significance to pleading
technicalities. Indeed, in some instances, the historically distinct substantive requirements of different claims for relief have been relaxed in
ways that make the selection and the availability of a particular tort
theory less important than those matters might previously have
been.47 It is against this background, which might be described as a
commitment to the resolution of disputes on essential rather than peripheral bases,48 that one should consider the adverse consequences of
44. The assumption might be more narrowly phrased as one about the type of constitutional prob·
lem addressed in the Sullivan line of cases, concerning the deterrent effect on speech about matters of
public concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985)
("every . . . case in which this Court has found constitutional limits to state defamation laws . . .
involved expression on a matter of undoubted public concern").
45. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 133-37 (3d ed. 1985).
46. See, e.g., Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
47. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (l959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 918 (1960). In Martin, the Supreme Court of Oregon relaxed the traditional trespass to land
requirement that a tangible invading agent was necessary in order to permit a trespass claim to proceed.
That decision enabled the plaintiff to obtain a larger recovery than would have been obtainable under a
more plausibly applicable private nuisance theory, due to the longer limitations period associated with
the trespass action than with nuisance under that state's law.
48. That this commitment is substantially less than whole· hearted is demonstrated by the vitality
and manipulability of such justiciability doctrines as the law of standing. See generally Nichol,
thinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68 (1984).
It shouid also be noted that the popular perception of many constitutional guarantees, particularly
in the criminal procedure arena, views them as "technicalities." The argument from essence presented
in the text is not intended to extend beyond the specific context of the pleading characterization of what
happened to a plaintiff.

Re·
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conditioning constitutional protection on the particular tort theory the
plaintiff chooses to pursue.
In considering how a pleading characterization should affect liability, one needs to distinguish two types of cases, drawing the distinction on the basis of their relationship to the defamation action that the
Supreme Court initially subjected to first amendment limitations. In
the first situation, the circumstances out of which the claim arose
would be susceptible to a characterization as involving a defamatory
publication. In this situation, the plaintiff pleads a different tort theory as an alternative to the defamation theory that would clearly be
subject to constitutional restrictions of some sort.49 In the second situation, however, the circumstances out of which the claim arose would
not lend themselves to a defamation characterization. The pleading of
a tort theory other than defamation may be the only way in which a
plaintiff could recover in this situation.
The first situation, which will be labelled the pleading of a redundant alternative to a defamation claim, presents the easiest case for
subjecting the nondefamation tort action to constitutional restriction.
Permitting the plaintiff to select an alternative (nondefamation) theory
to escape first amendment scrutiny of a claim that would have received
such scrutiny if pleaded as a defamation action carries with it all the
arbitrariness and potential for abuse associated with the hypertechnical forms of action of a discredited age of common law pleading. 50
The second situation, which will be called a nonevasive alternative,
may require more in the way of a justification for the imposition of
constitutional restraints on liability. If this sort of claim is not used
simply as a way to get around the constitutional barriers that a defamation plaintiff would face, one might question why it should be subject to constitutional limitations at all. In answering that question, it
must be emphasized that the focus at this stage of the analysis is only
on whether there should be any constitutional limitations, and not on
the very different issue of what the constitutional limitations ought to
be.
The successful assertion of tort claims requires proof of a combination of elements, two of which are crucial for an understanding of
49. The variety of these situations, with their attendant protections, is described in leBel, supra
note 38, and in Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytical Primer on the
Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L. J. 1519 (1987).
50. The author has previously proposed a reform of the law of defamation that calls for treating
damages for the emotional distress produced by a defamatory publication as an element of recovery
that would be just as much an inherent part of the defamation action as the more traditional element of
damages for injury to reputation. See LeBel, supra note 38, at 297-304. Adoption of that reform would
make it much easier to identify the occurrence and to administer the litigation of the redundant alternative tort claim described in the text.
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the issue under consideration here. Every tort claim requires both
some liability-forming conduct on the part of the defendant and some
particular legally cognizable harm to the plaintiff. These elements can
be either very general, as in the case of a negligence claim,5! or very
specific, as is the case for the various intentional torts. 52 In the context
of a defamation claim, the required liability-forming conduct consists
of the publication of a statement that is capable of injuring the reputation of the plaintiff. 53 Reputational harm is not a constitutional prerequisite to recovery;54 rather, it is the communication's potential for
inflicting such harm that is the gravamen of the tort claim for defamation. The first of ,the categories described above, the redundant alternative pleading, could be fashioned simply by failing to allege the
reputational harm potential of the challenged speech, even if that capacity was demonstrable. Indeed, such a demonstration should suffice
to bring the nondefamation claim within the scope of the same constitutional restrictions that would be imposed on the defamation claim. 5s
For the reasons that will be described below, 56 that scenario was not
what was presented in the Falwell situation.
The compelling argument for sUbjecting even non evasive alternative tort claims to first amendment scrutiny can be understood if one
focuses on the characterization of the content of the speech that is
coincidentally capable of injuring reputation, rather than on the fact
that reputational injury is a possible result of the speech. Contemporary constitutional limitations on tort liability focus on speech that
involves "a matter of public concern."57 Precisely what is a matter of
public concern has not yet been adequately addressed by the Court. 58
The important point for this analysis is that, however one might determine what speech involves a matter of public concern, there is no necessary link between that speech and reputational harm. In other
words, what is critical to the assertion of constitutional protection is the
51. The liability-forming conduct may be described simply as a failure to exercise reasonable care.
and the compensable harm is generally any physical injury to the person or the property of the plaintiff.
52. A claim for the intentional tort of battery. for example. requires liability-forming conduct that
consists of an intent to inflict a harmful or an offensive contact. or to cause the imminent apprehension
of such contact. The harm must be either a harmful or an offensive contact. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13-20 (1965).
53. See id. at § 559 comment d (1977) ("To be defamatory. it is not necessary that the communication actually cause harm to another's reputation or deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him. Its character depends upon its general tendency to have such an effect") (emphasis added).
54. Time. Inc. v. Firestone. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
55. See supra note 49.
56. See infra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
57. See Dun & Bradstreet. Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders. Inc .• 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Connick v.
Myers. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
58. See Dun & Bradstreet. 472 U.S. at 785 (Brennan. J .• dissenting).
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public-issue cont~nt of the speech and not any particular capacity for
reputational harm. The fact that a nondefamation tort claim does not
implicate the reputation of a plaintiff is therefore not a compelling reason for that claim to escape constitutional restraint.
The conclusion called for by the discussion in this section of the
article is that as long as a tort claim arises out of speech that involves a
matter of public concern, the rationale for first amendment protection
is, or at least ought to be, presumptively satisfied. As suggested earlier, however, the nature of that first amendment protection is a matter
that requires much more careful attention than it has received from
either of the appellate decisions that have differed on the acceptability
of the district court judgment for Falwell on the intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim that he asserted against Flynt and Hustler
Magazine. The next section of the article examines the Fourth Circuit
and Supreme Court decisions and explains why each was inadequate.

II.

THE LIMITED UTILITY OF THE DEFAMATION EXPERIENCE

Both the Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Falwell
drew heavily on the experience developed over two decades in the application of first amendment constraints on tort recovery under a defamation theory of liability. Unfortunately, as this section of the article
demonstrates, that experience is of much more limited utility in fashioning constitutional restrictions on emotional distress tort recovery
than either of the appellate decisions recognized. Following this section's critique of both appellate Falwell decisions, the article will offer
a different model of the manner in which the first amendment should
limit recovery under the intentional infliction of emotional distress
theory.
This section's disc"ussion of the Falwell decisions proceeds from
the premise that constitutional protection of the defendants' publication was necessary to prevent Falwell's recovery. As will be demonstrated at the beginning of the next section of the article, 59 a plausible
argument can be made that this premise is flawed, and that the case
need not have been decided on constitutional grounds. Even if one
accepts the premise that the first amendment had to be invoked to
prevent Falwell's recovery, however, the manner in which the appellate courts applied first amendment protection to the defendants can
be criticized in ways that are useful in constructing a different method
of limiting recovery for emotional distress in speech-about cases. 60 Because the mistakes of the Fourth Circuit appear to influence the
59. See infra notes 109-22 and accompanying text.
60. Implicit in this discussion is the earlier distinction between speech-to and speech-about, and
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Supreme Court's perspective on the case, the court of appeals decision
will be analyzed first.
The Fourth Circuit opinion addressed two constitutional arguments asserted by the defendants: first, that recovery was impermissible without a showing of the "actual malice" required in public
plaintiff defamation cases;61 and second, that the speech was entitled
to absolute immunity as an expression of opinion. 62 Rejecting both of
those arguments, the court of appeals concluded that the judgment
entered on the verdict for the plaintiff was consistent with the first
amendment.
The first of the two constitutional arguments raised by the defendants-that the emotional distress plaintiff must prove "actual malice"-requires more attention than the other, because it was in their
treatment of that argument that the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court reached different but equally erroneous conclusions in Falwell.
The Fourth Circuit followed a simple reasoning process in order to
arrive at its conclusion that the plaintiff did not have to prove the
"actual malice" initially demanded in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 63 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public official plaintiff could not recover damages for defamatory statements about his
official conduct unless those statements were proved by clear and convincing evidence to have been made with knowledge that they were
false or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false.
"Actual malice" was the label selected by the Court for the fault element imposed on public official defamation plaintiffs,64 and subsequently extended to plaintiffs characterized as public figures. 65
In Falwell, the Fourth Circuit decided that: (1) the significance of
the Sullivan case was its transformation of libel from a strict liability
to a high culpability tort;66 (2) the tort of intenJional infliction of emotional distress already included a high level of culpability as a necessary element;67 and therefore (3) the culpability requirement contained
the application of constitutional restraints only to recovery for the latter. See supra notes 37-46 and
accompanying text.
61. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 1273-74.
63. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
64. Id. at 280.
65. See generally LeBel, supra note 38, at 254-59.
66. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986) ("When applied to a defamation action,
the actual malice standard alters none of the elements of the tort; it merely increases the level of fault
the plaintiff must prove").
67. Id. ("The first of the four elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress ... [intentional or reckless misconduct] is precisely the level of fault that New York Times requires in an action
for defamation") (emphasis added).
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in the prima facie case for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim provided the protection to the defendants that the Constitution had previously been found to demand in the libel context. 68
While the reasoning process used by the court may appear to be valid,
careful reflection reveals that the process is built on faulty premises.
The court of appeals opinion attaches undue significance to the
level of culpability that was declared in the Sullivan line of cases to be
a constitutional prerequisite to recovery on a defamation claim by a
public official or public figure plaintiff. 69 Finding that same level of
culpability in the emotional distress action,70 the court reaches the
dual conclusion that the kind of culpability required by Sullivan need
not be proven in an emotional distress action and that the proof of the
emotional distress action's kind of culpability serves the same constitutional protection function as the Sullivan "actual malice" requirement.
The first of those conclusions, despite the Supreme Court's rejection of
it,?! is arguably correct, but for reasons other than those relied on by
the Fourth Circuit. The second conclusion is incorrect, and provides
an opportunity to begin reshaping the constitutional protection afforded to an emotional distress defendant.
The significance of the Sullivan line of cases extends beyond the
mere fact that a heightened fault requirement was attached to what
had traditionally been a strict liability tort claim. Of much greater
significance is the type of fault that was adopted as a constitutional
prerequisite to recovery. "Actual malice" is a state of mind that displays fault regarding the truth or falsity of the communication. The
Supreme Court tailored this type of fault element to meet the specific
concerns that were implicated by the finding of liability in the lower
courts in the Sullivan case. Of special concern was the possibility that
liability for innocent misstatements of fact would make the publisher
the guarantor of the accuracy of what was said, which in turn would
create a climate in which the publication of important statements
would be "chilled" if the accuracy of those statements could not easily
be guaranteed by their publisher. 72 In order to reduce the deterrence
to publication posed by an application of the tort law rules applied by
the state courts in Sullivan, the Supreme Court decided that liability
could only be imposed on a defendant who had been proven by clear
68. Id. ("We ... hold that when the first amendment requires application of the actual malice
standard, the standard is met when the jury finds that the defendant's intentional or reckless misconduct has proximately caused the injury complained of").
69. See supra note 65.
70. See supra note 66.
71. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
72. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 278-82 (\964).
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and convincing evidence to have published with knowledge of falsity
or with reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of the communication. 73 While that "actual malice" findi~g may be characterized as
intent or recklessness, and thus apparently making it analogous to an
intent or recklessness element of a different tort action, the specific
nature of the "actual malice" state of mind needs to be recognized as
constituting "intent to misstate a fact" or "recklessness as to the truth
or falsity of a fact."
The culpability element of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress tort is substantially different from the "actual malice" requirement of the Sullivan line of cases. Intent in this context refers to the
intent to produce the consequence of emotional distress, and ought to
be satisfied with proof of either of the Restatement versions of intenta purpose to cause such a consequence or a knowledge that the consequence was substantially certain to occur.74 Recklessness in this context is a heightened version of negligence, requiring proof from which
it can be inferred that the plaintiff acted in .spite of a high probability
that emotional distress would be produced by the speech.7s Nothing
in the emotional distress tort necessarily involves a culpable state of
mind with regard to the truth or falsity of a statement of fact. Conversely, the state of mind that would constitute intent or recklessness
in the emotional distress context would not necessarily be relevant to
the issue of "actual malice" in the defamation setting. "Actual malice" focuses exclusively on fault as to falsity, while the intent and recklessness elements of other tort claims are concerned with fault as to
the harmful consequence. Reliance as sufficient protection on proof of
that latter kind of fault, which would be an intent or recklessness with
regard to injuring the reputation of a plaintiff, was rejected in the Sullivan line of decisions in favor of the focus on the state of mind with
regard to the truth or falsity of the communication. 76
Once it is understood that there is a significant difference between
"actual malice" and the culpability element of the emotional distress
tort claim, two questions remain. First, does the "actual malice" requirement make sense as a prerequisite to recovery for emotional dis73. [d. at 279-80. The Sullivan case dealt only with defamatory speech that was alleged to be
about the official conduct of a public official. Later extensions of the "actual malice" rule to litigation
arising from defamatory statements about other types of plaintiffs are described in LeBel, supra note 38,
at 254-59.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
75. See id. at § 500.
76. The distinction is often drawn in the cases as a difference between "actual malice" as defined
in Sullivan and what now needs to be referred to as "common-law malice," in the sense of ill will
toward, or intent to injure, the plaintiff. See. e.g.. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, 419 U.S. 245, 25152 (1974) (distinguishing "actual malice" from "common-law malice").
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tress? Because the Supreme Court answered that question
affirmatively,77 discussion of that issue will be taken up in the context
of a comprehensive analysis of that Court's decision. 78 The second
question is whether the court of appeals was correct in its conclusion
that the culpability element of the emotional distress claim provides
sufficient protection for the first amendment interests liability under
this tort theory threatens. Arriving at the proper negative answer to
that question requires a shift from the Fourth Circuit's narrow focus
on what seems to be the same level of culpability shared by the two
fault standards to an inquiry recognizing that different consequences
might very well flow from requiring proof of different types of
culpability.
The previously established distinction between fault-as-to-falsity
and fault-as-to-harmful-consequence is important not simply as a matter of academic interest. Its significance lies in the functional role that
a CUlpability requirement plays in establishing the contours of a tort
claim. The "actual malice" fault element injected by the Sullivan line
of cases into public plaintiff defamation actions focuses on the defendant's state of mind regarding the truth or falsity of the communication
as a means of protecti!1g constitutionally valuable true speech that
might be deterred by a strict liability rule. Imagining a spectrum (see
Figure 1) in which true speech is divided from false speech, the Sullivan court was concerned about protecting and promoting all the constitutionally valuable speech on the true side of the dividing line. 79 In
order to provide that protection, false speech is also constitutionally
protected as long as the defendant did not have the requisite degree of
culpability about the truth or falsity of what was said. From the
standpoint of the publisher, therefore, what is protected is innocentor in the case of speech about a public official or a public figure, negligent-misstatements of fact,80 even though those misstatements have
no constitutional value. 8l Ifthe goal is one of encouraging, or at least
not discouraging, true speech, then it makes some sense to have a culpability element that makes liability turn on the one thing that a po77. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988).
78. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
79. The best explanation of this idea is found in Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the "Chilling Effect, " 58 B. V.L. REV. 685 (\978).
80. This is represented on Figure 1 as the speech to the left of the line dividing "no liability" from
"liability" and to the right of the line dividing "true speech" from "false speech."
81. The Supreme Court has stated explicitly that false statements of fact have no constitutional
value. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 V.S. 323, 340 (1974). For a suggestion that this view is not
necessarily correct, see LeBel, supra note 38, at 290 n.209. See also L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 53-58 (1986).
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tential defendant can control, which is that defendant's own state of
mind regarding the truth or falsity of what is being communicated.

FIGURE 1.
Constitutional Protection of Defamatory Speech
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The kind of culpability involved in the intentional infliction of
emotional distress-either an intent to cause emotional distress or
recklessness about the production of that result-does not protect constitutionally valuable speech as much as the fault-as-to-falsity rules of
the Sullivan line of cases. Some of the most important speech in our
society may in fact be uttered with just the kind of culpability that is
required for the emotional distress tort action. The recognition of this
fact is undoubtedly what led the Supreme Court to comment on its
inability to distinguish vehement political rhetoric and caustic satire
from Hustler's attack on Falwell. 82
To look at the matter of potential liability once again from the
standpoint of the publisher, the Fourth Circuit's rule protects speech
that innocently or negligently produces emotional distress. The faulty
parallel between the Fourth Circuit's culpability decision and the effect of the "actual malice" rule is easily demonstrable. As described
above, the "actual malice" rule attempts to prevent the chilling of true
speech by extending constitutional protection to some false speech.
The Fourth Circuit's rule operates to protect some speech that (innocently or negligently) causes emotional distress. If the Fourth Circuit
is correct in its assertion that the relevant concern is the level of culpability, so that the intent or recklessness fault element of the emotional
distress action is a legitimate substitute for the "actual malice" re82. 108

s.

Ct. at 881.
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quirement, the equivalent spectrum in this context (see Figure 2)
would depict the difference between speech that does not cause emotional distress and speech that does. To depict the liability possibilities
along that spectrum would make it appear that the constitutional
value the Fourth Circuit's rule protects would be the publication of
speech that does not cause emotional distress. In order to prevent the
chilling of some of this kind of speech, the Constitution would be seen
as protecting speech that does cause emotional distress, as long as it
does so only innocently or negligently. This faulty parallel to the Sullivan rationale for the "actual malice" rule suggests the need to look
for an alternative explanation of the relationship between first amendment interests and the threat posed by unrestrained liability under the
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort claim. 83
FIGURE 2.
The Flawed Protection Scheme of the Fourth
Circuit's Decision
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This exercise in tracing the reasoning behind the "actual malice"
requirement and in finding such reasoning inapplicable to the emotional distress context reveals that the Fourth Circuit'S focus only on
the levels of culpability involved in an intentional tort and in the "actual malice" standard is incomplete. A constitutional fault rule for the
emotional distress tort action that does not focus on the kind of fault
as well as the level of fault does not serve the same protective function
as the "actual malice" rule of the law of defamation. Although the
Fourth Circuit's method of drawing a parallel to the Sullivan fault
standard is unsuccessful, the attempt to construct a parallel provides
an instructive lesson for the development of a properly constitutional83. An alternative model is depicted in figure 3, infra p. 352.
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ized emotional distress tort, that is pursued below. 84 The analysis of
the Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, demonstrates that a fault element focusing only on the state of mind of the defendant with regard
to causing harm to the plaintiff provides an insufficient shield for
speech that should receive constitutional protection.
What emerges is a conclusion that the Court of Appeals asked the
wrong question. Instead of asking whether the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort action required the same level of fault as the
constitutionalized public plaintiff defamation action, the court should
have asked whether the intentional or reckless misconduct culpability
element of the emotional distress action was as effective at protecting
constitutionally valuable speech as the "actual malice" requirement.
Because the answer to that question is no, the Supreme Court was
correct in rejecting the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the fault element
of the emotional distress action.
However correct the Supreme Court was in rejecting the rationale
for the Fourth Circuit's decision, the Court's performance was marred
by its failure to appreciate the problems created by adopting a fairly
uncritical attitude toward incorporating into the emotional distress
context the specific details of the constitutional protection developed
for defamatory speech. The Supreme Court held that Falwell could
recover only if he proved that a false statement of fact had been published with "actual malice."85 That holding distorts the treatment of
the issues presented to the Court in two different ways. First, the kind
of fault embodied in the "actual malice" standard has no particular
relevance to an emotional distress action. As already explained, fault
as to falsity has no necessary relationship to intent or recklessness with
regard to the infliction of emotional distress. 86 Furthermore, the conceptual thrust of the emotional distress claim does not depend on any
showing of the communication of false statements of fact. As a result
of the grafting of a new "false factual statement" requirement onto the
emotional distress action,87 the Court has created a hybrid tort action
that inadequately protects individuals from harmful conduct designed
to injure them.
Second, the Court's implication that a false statement of fact is
the only kind of speech that is actionable is unwarranted. The Court
has transformed a description of the kind of speech that is conditionally constitutionally privileged (that is, defamatory statements) into an
84. See infra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
85. Falwell, 108 s. Ct. at 882.
86. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
87. The Fourth Circuit was correct in recognizing that the application of the "actual malice"
requirement would accomplish this. See Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986).
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exhaustive description of the kind of speech that might have liability
attached to it. Such a transformation must rest at least implicitly on a
conclusion that any harm caused by speech other than a false statement of fact must necessarily be less significant than the social value
that is attached to that speech. While that conclusion may legitimately be reached on a case-by-case evaluation, this is not an appropriate instance or the proper level of abstraction for the Court to use
the categorical determinations employed elsewhere in the constitutionalization of speech torts.88 Given the faulty premises from which the
Court's holding emerged, its opinion is a matter of limited precedential value, largely confined to the facts of the Falwell case, until the
Court returns to the issue of how to set first amendment restrictions
on recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Supreme Court's decision to incorporate the "actual malice"
standard developed in the defamation context into the emotional distress tort action represents nearly as poor an appreciation bf how that
standard functions as was displayed by the Fourth Circuit. On that
point, the opinion of Justice White concurring in the judgment in.
Falwell is surely correct. 89 What is missing from that concurring
opinion, however, is any explanation of why "the decision in New
York Times v. Sullivan . .. has little to do with this case."90 The
reason why the Sullivan decision has little to do with the Falwell case
is simple: the emotional distress claim asserted by Falwell is sufficiently different from a defamation claim that the rules adopted for
defamation claims do not fit in the emotional distress context. What
the Court failed to grasp was the nature and the significance of that
difference. The Court's basic error was treating alike categories of
claims that are not alike.
Correcting the Court's error requires a careful consideration of
the distinction drawn earlier91 between redundant and nonevasive alternatives to a defamation claim. Before explaining how to apply the
distinction between redundant and nonevasive alternatives, however, it
88. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,343-44 (1974) (refusing to strike the balance
between "needs of the press and the individual's claim to compensation" on a case-by-case basis, and
instead laying down "broad rules of general application"). In this case, the implicit Falwell rule-to the
effect that there can be no liability for anything that is not a false statement of fact-is adopted without
even the broad type of balancing that the Court performed in Gertz. The alternative approach described below proceeds from the premise that individual harm may outweigh the value even of speech
that does not communicate a false statement of fact. The important inquiry is whether particular
speech has value. That determination ought not to be made on the basis of a general dichotomy between false statements of fact and all other speech.
89. 108 S. Ct. 876, 883.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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would be helpful to provide a preliminary statement of the general
rules that should be followed.
Alternative tort claims that are properly characterized as redundant ought to be treated in the same way. In this setting, that rule
means that the pleading of alternative claims should be collapsed into
one claim, so that the highest level of constitutional protection recognized for any of the alternatives ought to govern the outcome of all the
alternatives. 92 Nonevasive alternatives, on the other hand, ought not
to be treated as identical. Accordingly, when faced with a nonevasive
alternative to a defamation claim the Court should determine what
sort of constitutional restriction to impose on that alternative tort
claim, rather than simply transfer the defamation restrictions to a context in which they do not fit.
For those general rules to have any utility, it is necessary to be
able to identify which type of alternative is present in a particular tort
action. The purpose of the distinction is to separate those nondefamation tort claims that are mere evasions of constitutional restrictions
from those that are something more. It should be understood that the
last phrase is deliberately "something more," rather than "something
else." A nonevasive tort claim is, of course, on one level a way around
the barriers that stand between the plaintiff and recovery. If the only
factor in classifying the alternatives was the intent of the plaintiff to
recover under a theory that avoids barriers associated with another
theory, then all nondefamation claims arising out of a set of facts in
which a defamation claim has some minimum plausibility would be
classified as redundant. As used in this context, however, the distinction between redundant and nonevasive claims refers not to the intent
to find another way to recover, but rather to the presence of a factual
predicate for a claim that does not simply correspond to the defamation predicate.
As mentioned earlier,93 fault-based tort claims share two general
features that are relevant to the distinction suggested here. First, they
consist of a particular kind of wrongful conduct, and second, they produce a particular kind of invasion of a legally protected interest. The
difference between redundant and nonevasive tort claims might be expressed in terms of those two features in this way: If the conduct and
the harm asserted in multiple tort claims are identical, then multiple
tort claims can be classified as redundant despite the ability to charac92. There is an implicit assumption in the statement in the text that the higher levels of constitutional protection are associated with the defamation claims. To the extent that the assumption proves
to be ungrounded. see infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. the general rule stated in the text
might alternatively be read in a way that substitutes "most carefully thought out" for "highest."
93. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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terize one or more elements of the tort claims in different ways. A
couple of examples will illustrate the distinction, which can then be
applied to the facts of the Falwell case.
Suppose that my name is put forward as a nominee for appointment as a federal judge, and that a faculty colleague writes a letter to
the editor of the local newspaper asserting that I have been using cocaine in the faculty lounge. That letter contains a false (trust me!) and
defamatory statement, published to a third person, capable of doing
great damage to my reputation. The wrongful conduct of my colleague consists of publishing a false statement capable of causing injury to my reputation, which is the gravamen of the tort of
defamation. 94 The harm caused by that conduct can consist of a
number of different effects, all of which the law of defamation recognizes as legally cognizable harms. Those effects include such matters
as reputational injury, special damages (in the sense of actual loss attributable to the reputational injury-the withdrawal of the nomination, for example), and actual injury other than reputational injury
(such as emotional distress).95
The facts underlying my defamation claim in this hypothetical
also may be characterized as extreme and outrageous conduct by my
colleague that might cause me to suffer severe emotional distress. An
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim would nevertheless be
classified as redundant in this instance for two reasons. Fjrst, exactly
the same conduct on the part of the defendant that serves as the basis
of the defamation claim also serves as the basis of the emotional distress claim. On this occasion, the extreme and outrageous conduct by
the defendant consists of the publication of the false statement capable
of causing injury to my reputation. Second, the law that governs the
disposition of the defamation claim allows me to recover for the interference with my interest in freedom from emotional distress, even if no
actual injury to reputation is established. Even if I cannot prove that
my reputation was injured, damages for emotional distress are a compensable type of actual injury for which the Supreme Court has found
recovery to be constitutionally permissible. 96 The difference between
the defamation claim and the emotional distress claim lies first in the
characterization of the defendant's conduct in a particular way, that
is, as extreme and outrilgeous rather than as publication of a defamatory statement. The second difference between the emotional distress
claim and a defa~ation claim lies in the identification of an indepen94. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
95. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
96. See supra note 54.
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dently protectable legal interest in freedom from emotional distress
rather than just the interest in the preservation of reputation. Under
the first of the general rules proposed above, because the alternative.
claims can be characterized as redundant, the emotional distress claim
should be collapsed into the defamation claim, and the liability of the
defendant determined under the constitutional restrictions associated
with defamation.
Another example of how to identify a redundant alternative tort
claim involves a situation in which the plaintiff asserts a false light
invasion of privacy claim. Commentators and courts have attempted
to explain the distinction between a false light claim and a defamation
claim arising from the same conduct. The more plausible attempts to
distinguish the claims point to· the difference between an interest in
privacy and an interest in reputation. 97 As long as the two characteristic factors identified above are present, however, it would be appropriate to characterize the false light claim as a redundant alternative.
That characterization follows from the identification of identical conduct on the part of the defendant (publication of a false statement that
tends to injure the reputation of the plaintiff) which typically underlies
both claims, and from the determination that the different interest invasion protected by the false light claim (the harms associated with
having one's privacy invaded by being presented to the public as something other ,than what one is) is compensable within the defamation
claim. In circumstances in which a false light claim can be characterized as a redundant alternative to a defamation claim, there is no reason to permit the false light privacy claim to operate as a means of
avoiding the constitutional protections that have been developed for
defamatory speech.
Further evidence of the analytical utility of the distinction between redundant and nonevasive alternatives is provided by the
Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional restrictions imposed
on false light claims. At the time of its first consideration of the false
light claim,98 the Court had adopted the "actual malice" rule for public official defamation plaintiffs,99 but had yet to consider the various
other issues that flowed from that initial decision. loo At that time, the
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E comment b (1977). See also Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, 433 U.S. 562, 572-74 (1977) (describing differe~ces between defamation
and false light privacy torts).
98. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
99. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376·U.S. 254 (1964).
100. The decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1964), preceded by five months the decision
extending the "actual malice" rule to public figure defamation plaintiffs. See Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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Court extended to the false light privacy defendant the same constitutional protection that it had given to defamation defendants, namely,
the restriction of liability to a claim based on a communication that
was published with "actual malice." 101 Subsequently, distinctions
among types of plaintiffs 102 and kinds of speech 103 were introduced
into the defamation context as bases for the adoption of different sorts
of constitutional rules, but similar distinctions have yet to be adopted
by the Supreme Court in the false light context. 104
The two examples discussed so far have presented alternative tort
claims that should be characterized as redundant. Under the rule proposed here, those claims should be subjected to the constitutional restrictions associated with the defamation claim.105 What remains for
consideration is the hypothesis that the emotional distress claim in the
Falwell case is not a redundant alternative to a defamation claim. As a
nonevasive alternative, the emotional distress claim would therefore
require the development of its own constitutional regime distinct from
the defamation claim.
A redundancy characterization requires the alternative tort claim
to be based on the same wrongful conduct and to cause a kind of harm
that is compensable within the framework of a defamation claim. For
a defamation claim to be available, the defendant must have published
a false statement of fact capable of injuring the reputation of the plaintiff.106 According to the finding of the jury in the Falwell case, that is
not what the defendants did in this case. The jury's finding, which was
accepted by both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, was
that the published statements could not reasonably be understood to
be statements of actual facts or events. 107 If that is true, then the state101. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 390.
102. See supra notes 73, 100.
103. See supra note 57.
104. The latest false light decision of the Court was Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419
U.S. 245 (1974). Because the liability of the defendant in that case was based on the plaintifrs presentation of evidence that was sufficient to satisfy the "actual malice" standard of culpability, Cantrell did
not present the Supreme Court with an occasion for consideration of whether the first amendment
prohibited a standard permitting recovery on a lesser showing of culpability to govern some false light
claims.
105. The normative suggestion that follows from the drawing of the distinction between redundant and nonevasive alternatives calls for a reform of the current disparity between the constitutional
restrictions attached to defamation claims and those attached to false light claims. Different constitutional rules for those redundant alternative claims need to be eliminated or independently justified. The
false light experience provides an interesting example of how the Supreme Court could employ the
analytical method offered here to reach a result-equivalent constitutional rules for two tort claimsthat is proper in the false light context but improper in the emotional distress context presented in
Falwell.
106. See supra note 53.
107. See supra note 3.
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ments should not be characterized as capable of injuring the reputation of the plaintiff. Common sense suggests that a plaintiffs
reputation would not be affected by statements that the jury found no
reasonable person could take to be true statements about that plaintiff.
Given the finding of the jury, therefore, the wrongful conduct of the
defendants must have consisted of something other than the publication of false statements of fact capable of injuring the reputation of the
plaintiff. Because a defamation claim was not available in this situation, it would be inappropriate to consider the emotional distress tort
claim to be a redundant alternative to a defamation claim. If the claim
is nonevasive rather than redundant, then under the rule proposed
above the Court should consider what type of constitutional restrictions ought to be placed on this claim.
Earlier in this section of this article,108 two questions were identified as being presented by the Falwell case. First, should the "actual
malice" rule apply to emotional distress actions? The court of appeals
correctly said no, while the Supreme Court erroneously said yes. Second, does the fault element of the emotional distress tort provide adequate protection for valuable speech? The court of appeals incorrectly
said yes, while the Supreme Court's affirmative response to the first
question implied that it would reach the proper negative answer. The
remaining task of this article is to demonstrate how each of those two
questions could have been answered correctly by adopting a comprehensive explanation of why and how the first amendment affects recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
III. A

PROPERLY CONSTITUTION ALI ZED EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
TORT

Before considering the manner in which the emotional distress
tort ought to be constitutionalized, it is useful to pursue the questiorf
of whether there was any need to resort to constitutional decisionmaking in the Falwell case. The first amendment comes into play in this
sort of situation only if free speech interests are threatened by liability
imposed on a defendant as a matter of state tort law. One might easily
argue that because the plaintiffs tort claim should have been held to
be insufficient as a matter of tort law, the Falwell case need never have
been presented to the United States Supreme Court. For that reason,
Falwell is distinguishable from such landmark first amendment cases
as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.109 In Sullivan, the threat to first
amendment interests was posed by the application of a body of state
108. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
109. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tort law as it was understood and fairly routinely applied by the state
courts. Because no error of state law was committed in the Sullivan
case, 110 the options for protecting the first amendment interests were
limited to changing state law (a matter for the state legislature or judiciary) or to finding some federal constitutional restriction to impose on
recovery under the state law. Given the reasons to suspect that the
threat to first amendment interests was in line with and not just coincidental to the state policy of that time, 111 the Supreme Court correctly
stepped in to impose constitutional limitations on the tort law under
which the plaintiff recovered.
The Falwell case presents a significantly different scenario. First,
no state court had ever decided the tort law issues involved in
Falwell's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The case
was filed in a federal district court, with the appeal from the judgment
in favor of Falwell proceeding naturally to the federal court of appeals.
Thus there was no definitive statement comparable to the Alabama
Supreme Court decision in Sullivan approving the application of state
law to impose liability on the defendant. Second, the emotional distress tort claim Falwell asserted had only fairly recently been recognized by the state supreme court. 112 As a result, there was relatively
little authority from which the federal court could predict what the
Virginia state courts would ao with that sort of claim. Third, there is
absolutely no basis from which to infer that hostility to first amendment interests was part of the public policy or the political climate
prevailing within Virginia at the time of the Falwel/litigation as it was
in Alabama at the time of Sullivan. Finally, and most significantly,
the decision by the federal district court to allow the plaintiff to recover on an emotional distress claim imposed as undemanding an application of the state tort law's elements of proof as one is likely to
find.
The intentional infliction of emotional distress action recognized
by the Supreme Court of Virginia requires the plaintiff to prove the
defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional dis110. The trial court's judgment based on the verdict for the plaintiff in Sullivan was affirmed by
the state supreme court. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (\962).
II \. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)
(describing other libel actions pending in Alabama state courts, and commenting, from the informed
perspective of a native of Alabama, on the likelihood that the plaintiff's position in his community had
been improved rather than harmed by the publication of statements that attributed racially discrimina·
tory acts to him). See also Pierce, The Anatomy 0/ an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 43 N.C. L.REV. 315 (1965).
112. See Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974). This case was decided by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in December 1974. Falwell's claim was filed in October 1983.
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tress. 113 This standard should be applied in a more demanding fashion
than it was in Falwell. In the leading case in which the state supreme
court recognized the tort claim, Womack v. Eldridge,114 an investigator working for a lawyer who was defending a client accused of child
molesting tricked her way into the plaintiff's home and took a photograph of the plaintiff. That photograph was then shown to the victims
of the molestation, who were asked whether the plaintiff was the man
who had molested them. The victims testified that the plaintiff was
not the person, but the authorities nevertheless pursued the issue of
whether the plaintiff was involved in the offense. 115 At the trial of his
emotional distress claim, the plaintiff testified that he had "suffered
great shock, distress, and nervousness," that he "suffered great anxiety
as to what people would think of him," that he feared that he would be
accused of child molesting as a result of the defendant's conduct, and
that he "had been unable to sleep while the matter was being investigated."116 The state supreme court's opinion in that case also notes
that the plaintiff became "emotional and incoherent" while he was testifying. 117 In addition, the plaintiff's wife testified that the plaintiff
"experienced great shock and mental depression" as a result of the
incident. 118
The record in the Falwell case on the issue of the severity of the
plaintiff's emotional distress is significantly less compelling than in
Womack. The Fourth Circuit excerpt from the plaintiff's testimony at
trial speaks of "anger" that turned into "a more rational and deep
hurt." 119 A colleague of the plaintiff testified that the plaintiff's "ability to concentrate on the myriad details of running his extensive ministry was diminished."120 Absent is any evidence that even comes close
to being equivalent to evidence of emotional distress that the state
courts had previously characterized as severe. Hence, the district
court in Falwell could have granted a directed verdict in favor of the
defendants or entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
emotional distress claim. Failing that, the appellate courts could have
113. According to the RESTATEMENT, "[t]he law intervenes only where the [emotional] distress
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the
duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment i (1965).
114. 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
115. [d. at 339-40, 210 S.E.2d at 146-47.
116. [d. at 340, 210 S.E.2d at 147.
117. [d.
118. [d.
119. See 797 F.2d at 1276.
120. [d. at 1277. Rodney Smolla's recent book on the case doesn't disclose any more compelling
evidence of the emotional distress suffered by Falwell. See generally R. SMOLLA, supra note 18.
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set aside the judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of the insufficiency
of the evidence to satisfy this element of the tort action. 121 Furthermore, if the federal courts were unsure how the Virginia state courts
would have characterized the evidence in this case, they had the option of using the state's recently adopted certification procedure. 122
Employing the certification option might have enabled the federal
courts to avoid the constitutional issue altogether by giving the
Supreme Court of Virginia the opportunity to rule that Falwell's emotional distress claim asserted by Falwell failed as a matter of state tort
law.
Falwell is thus distinguishable from a case such as Sullivan, in
that first amendment interests could have been adequately protected
by an application of state tort law that was arguably both fairly easily
obtainable and more demanding than the application that occurred in
the trial and appellate stages of the litigation. Nevertheless, because it
IS conceivable that an emotional distress action might be employed in
the manner in which the Alabama libel action was used in the Sullivan
litigation (i.e., to cast a deliberate chill on important speech), this arti- .
cle concludes by fixing the contours of a properly constitutionalized
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A useful preliminary step may be the identification of the basis for
allowing recovery on the underlying tort theory. As described earlier,123 the independent action for the infliction of emotional distress is
a relatively recent product of tort law. A consideration of why the
emotional distress tort action is justified at all might make the development of the first amendment restrictions on that action easier to
accomplish.
One of the best scholarly treatments of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress action is found in an article by Professor Daniel
Givelber,124 in which he asserts the "major mission and justification"
121. Independent appellate review of some constitutional issues in defamation cases has been explicitly approved by the Supreme Court. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466
U.S. 485 (1984). Under the Bose standard, the appellate court might have taken a very demanding look
at the evidence that supported a liability judgment with first amendmerit implications.
122. VA. CONST. art. VI, § I; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:42. This procedure allows federal courts to
certify to the state supreme court questions of state law that might dispose of the federal case without
requiring a consideration of federal constitutional issues that might otherwise be presented. The practice and the philosophical underpinnings of certification are described in LeBel, Legal Positivism and
Federalism: The Certification Experience, 19 GA. L. REV. 999 (1985).
The procedure was recently employed in a fede:al proceeding challenging the constitutionality of a
portion of the state's obscenity legislation. See Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 372
S.E.2d 618 (1988).
123. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
124. Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42 (1982).
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for the tort is "to provide the basis for achieving situational justice" 125
when a party in a disadvantageous position in a preexisting relationship fails to adhere to "a basic level offair procedure and decency."126
Discerning in the cases a use of the tort as the basis for providing
something on the order of a " 'private due process' in dealings between
unequals,"127 Professor Givelber finds the "results more unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent" when the parties do not have
a contractual relationship. 128
.
At the heart of the Givelber conception of the emotional distress
tort is the sense that the tortious conduct consists of the abusive exercise of power that the defendant holds over the plaintiff. Even in the
noncontractual sphere, however, that conception of the tort could
have considerable explanatory power. In order to arrive at the moral
foundation of this tort claim, one simply needs to ask what it is that is
abusive about that exercise of power. An answer that places this tort
claim in a broader category of moral reasoning is that the wrong consists of treating the plaintiff as a means to an end of the defendant,
rather than as an individual who is for that reason alone entitled to
respect and dignity. In the emotional distress context, the abuse consists of the defendant's use of the plaintiff's emotional well-being as a
means to further some private end of the defendant.
A plaintiff-as-means understanding of the basis for condemnation
of the defendant's conduct is likely to prove much too sweeping as a
basis for liability. Suggesting that a defendant faces tort liability any
time that the defendant acts in a way that treats the plaintiff as a
means to the defendant's end would bring tort law into play in what
would undoubtedly prove to be too numerous instances of a variety of
common situations. Such an understanding can, however, serve as the
cornerstone from which to evaluate and construct a constitutionalization scheme for the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Considering the tort claim in the light of why the
defendant's conduct is wrong might provide a core of coherence
around which a workable body of law can be built. 129
To constitutionalize the emotional distress tort action in the same
manner as the defamation and privacy torts have been constitutional125. Id. at 75.
126. Id. at 63.
127. Id. at 43.
128. Id. at 63.
129. Lee Bollinger's work on first amendment theory notes the tendency of free speech proponents to undervalue the harm that speech can cause. See, e.g., L BOLLINGER, supra note 82, at 57
passim. One of the purposes of the suggestion in the text is to take seriously the claims of individuals to
be free from emotional distress caused by the speech of other people.
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ized in the last quarter-century, one would examine the existing elements of the tort,130 looking for hooks on which to hang first
amendment protection. That search would attempt to identify those
elements of the tort claim that correct abuses in the application of the
tort action and defend the constitutional values that underlie the first
amendment. The falsity elements of defamation and false light privacy
claims have served that function in the context of promoting the publication of true statements of fact, but as explained earlier, the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim has no such falsity element.
However, there are two elements of the emotional distress claim that
can serve as the basis for the incorporation of constitutional restrictions on liability-the elements of damages and conduct.
As suggested earlier,131 the damages element of the emotional distress tort is the most promising basis on which to dispose of the claim
in the Falwell case. If the evidence in a particular case is determined
to be sufficient to satisfy the state tort law requirement that a plaintiff
suffer severe emotional distress, as it was held to do by the trial and
intermediate appellate courts in Falwell, \32 then making this element a
matter of constitutional significance offers a way to place first amendment restrictions on the tort recovery. Furthermore, this technique
would not be a radical departure from the way in which the first
amendment has been held to limit recovery in other tort contexts.
Constitutionalizing the damages element of a speech tort is' a tactic
adopted by the Court in the Gertz case.133 There the Court held that
presumed damages and punitive damages for defamatory publications
could only be recovered on a showing of "actual malice."134
Treating the damages element of the emotional distress tort as a
matter of constitutional significance has a number of advantages.
First, the Court could establish a constitutional threshold level of
harm that plaintiff must cross before the tort claim can succeed. In
this way, trivial interferences with emotional tranquility can be
screened out before claims are allowed to get to juries. Second, the
130. Those elements are:

I) intent or recklessness;
2) extreme and outrageous conduct;
3) proximate causation; and
4) severe emotional distress.

notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
See 797 F.2d at 1276-77.
Gertz v. Robert WeIch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
The Court subsequently held that the Gertz restriction on recovery of presumed and punitive
damages applies only in cases in which the defamatory communication involves a matter of public
concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).

See supra
131.
132.
133.
134.
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damages element might be sUbjected to the same heightened scrutiny
of appellate review as the "actual malice" requirement in defamation
cases.135 Such a standard of review would encourage trial courts to be
sure that a plaintiff has adequate evidence' of the element in question,
and would allow appellate courts to step in as a further safeguard
should the trial courts let the application of the constitutionalized
damages element slip below the requisite level of proof. Third, the
constitutionalized damages element might be subjected to a heightened
standard of proof, again following the model of the "actual malice"
requirement of the defamation tort action. 136 Insistence on proof of
the severity of the plaintiff's emotional distress by clear and convincing
evidence would not only act as a: further screening device for less than
compelling cases but would also give the trial court an opportunity to
dispose of the claim relatively early in the litigation process. 137
The multiple facets of this first step of constitutionalizing the
emotional distress tort action could serve as a basis for a preliminary
judicial evaluation of recovery for severe emotional distress in the
speech-about cases which pose the greatest threat to first amendment
values. Recovery in such cases should be limited to instances in which
the plaintiff has introduced clear and convincing evidence that the distress caused 138 by the defendant's conduct was, in some meaningful
sense, disabling. Absent such evidence, the emotional distress claim
should be dismissed as a matter of law.
Expert testimony from a health care professional could be intro-·
duced to establish that the emotional distress has reached the required
level, but medical testimony should not be made a necessary element
of proof. A plaintiff should simply be required to demonstrate in some
credible fashion that the defendant's conduct so disrupted and interfered with the plaintiff's ability to function in normal ways that the
emotional distress was, as a practical matter, virtually indistinguishable from a physical injury which forces a change in the plaintiff's
activity. Indeed, a sociologist who has worked closely with lawyers in
135. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
136. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) ("actual malice" must be
shown by proof of convincing clarity).
137. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (courts are to apply the clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof when evaluating sufficiency of evidence to survive a motion for
summary judgment).
138. The Virginia law of negligent infliction of emotional distress in cases in which there is no
physical impact with the body of the plaintiff requires that the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the emotional distress must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See
Hughes v. Moore, 211 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). A court concerned about the ease with which
emotional distress might be proved to be "severe" might use the causation element as another hook on
which to hang both the heightened standard of proof and the independent appellate review protective
devices employed in the defamation context.
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trying to understand the nature of the traumatic response to a disaster
refers to the possibility of "a kind of psychological concussion.,,139
This disabling distress standard could be applied in a manner that is
substantially more demanding than whatever standard the lower
courts thought they were applying in the Falwell case. Under this
standard, the testimony of anger and temporary distraction offered by
Falwell and his associate would fall short of establishing the disabling
level of distress required for recovery.
As part of the constitutionalization of the damages element of the
emotional distress tort, it ought to be made clear that the "bootstrap"
technique approved in the Restatement (Second) of Torts should not be
employed. According to the Restatement comments to § 46, the fact
that the distress is severe "must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself
important evidence that the distress has existed."I40 The inference of
one tort element from the existence of another is not unique to the
emotional distress action.141 However, in a case in which significant
constitutional interests might be placed in jeopardy, courts ought to
make it clear that the plaintiff must present convincing evidence of
each of the tort elements-particularly those that are being treated as
matters of constitutional significance.
The damages element of the emotional distress action is the
proper place to begin an inquiry into the manner in which a protection
of constitutional interests can be introduced into the tort claim. Once
the plaintiff has established that he or she has suffered disabling harm
and that the defendant intended to cause such harm, then the plaintiff
should be entitled to compensation unless the harm was justified or
privileged. This claim of entitlement to compensation, while not carrying with it an imposition of a formal burden of proof on the defendant,142 reflects the moral claim that the plaintiff should not have to be
the uncompensated victim of an intentional infliction of harm without
a good reason for imposing the burden of that injury on the plaintiff.
139. K. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFFALO
CREEK FLOOD 258 (1976).
.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
141. An example of this bootstrapping of elements is found in the malicious prosecution action.
Among the elements of the tort claim are the initiation of criminal proceedings without probable cause
and primarily for a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice (malice). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977). The RESTATEMENT allows the lack of probable cause to serve as
evidence of an improper purpose, id. § 669, but an improper purpose is not evidence of the lack of
probable cause, id. § 669A.

142. See, e.g.• Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) ("a private· figure
plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before recovering damages [for
defamation) from a media defendant").
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A claim by a person who has actually suffered severe emotional distress, at the hands of a defendant who intended that result, deserves to
be taken seriously by the courts.
The second of the emotional distress tort's elements that ought to
be made a matter of constitutional significance is requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct can be characterized as "extreme and outrageous." Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that this
element could not serve as the basis for distinguishing constitutionally
acceptable liability from impermissible infringements on first amendment values. 143 As the element was applied in the Falwell case, the
Chief Justice may have been correct. Simply stating that conduct
must be extreme and outrageous before attacJ. ing liability to the conduct would not be an adequate measure to extend first amendment
protection to constitutionally valuable speech. To the extent that the
lower court opinions in the Falwell case support that view, they were
properly rejected by the Supreme Court. However, in examining the
relationship between the first amendment and this tort action, the task
for the Court here is the same as it was in connection with the other
speech torts that have been constitutionalized. What the Court needs
to do is consider whether the element can be applied in a manner that
serves its protective purpose while still retaining an ability to accomplish the tort law aims associated with the action.
One way in which this element could be modified in order to still
distinguish permissible from impermissible liability situations would
be to pour some content into the nebulous terms "extreme" and "outrageous." In this instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts l44 provides almost no help to a court trying to establish guidelines for
litigation of emotional distress claims that impinge on constitutional
interests. The Restatement's treatment of this element depends more
on the factfinder's having an intuitive reaction of a particular kind
than on the factfinder reaching an intellectual conclusion. According
to the Restatement, this element is satisfied when "the conduct has
been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."145 Proof that
the defendant's conduct sinks to this level is described in the Restatement in a way that lends itself to a characterization as a trial by exclamatory outburst, stating that "[g]enerally, the case is one in which
the recitation of, the facts to an average member of the community
143. 108 s. Ct. at 881·82.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
145. Id.
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would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' "146
Given the Restatement's inadequate approach to the extreme and
outrageous conduct element, that element requires careful supplementation if the emotional distress tort claim is to be applied in a way that
does not too greatly infringe on first amendment interests. "Resentment of the actor" and "exclaiming, 'Outrageous!' " are reactions that
"an average member of the community" might have to a good deal of
constitutionally valuable and legitimately protected speech. Allowing
liability to turn on such a reaction, without any further check on liability, would create just the sort of difficulties that the Chief Justice
recognized in his Falwell opinion. The task for the Court, therefore, is
to fashion this element of the tort into a standard that adequately protects first amendment interests and yet leaves some room for the imposition of liability in situations in which constitutional protection is
undeserved and unwarranted. It is the attainment of that latter goal
that is missing entirely in the Court's decision in Falwell. The remainder of this article will show' that the goal can be reached.
Fortunately for one attempting to determine the nature of constitutionally acceptable definition of extreme and outrageous conduct,
there are two sources of guidance to construct a useful standard. One
is a matter of constitutional purpose and the other a matter of constitutional precedent. First, determining what the element is supposed to
accomplish is essential. The first amendment is designed to promote
the fullest possible expression of "speech that matters."147 In order to
accomplish that end, protection sometimes must be extended to speech
that does not matter, at least in constitutional terms. 148
When deciding whether constitutional protection ought to be extended to a particular situation, then, a court needs to ask two questions. An affirmative answer to either of those questions leads to a
recognition of limitations on liability. The first question is whether the
communication is speech that matters. If so, then the constitution requires some protection of that speech. First amendment precedent
provides a way to answer the question, as will be demonstrated
shortly. But even if that question is answered in the negative, an affirmative answer to a second question, about speech that does not matter, also leads to the recognition of constitutional protection. The
second question that needs to be asked about this category of speech is
146. [d.
147. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
148. See id. ("The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters") (emphasis added).
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whether the distinction between the speech at issue and speech that
matters is so difficult to draw that the risk of error in drawing the
distinction ought not to be placed on the speaker. It was a negative
answer to this second question on the issue of the truth of defamatory
statements that led the Court to adopt the "actual malice" requirement in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 149
If the difficulty of drawing the line dividing constitutionally valuable speech from speech that lacks such value is not very pronounced,
then the case for constitutional protection of the valueless speech is
considerably less compelling. It is when th!lt distinction is thought to
rest exclusively on the difference between truth and falsity that the
chilling effect concerns of the Sullivan line of cases are at their highest.
If another sort of distinction can be identified, one that is more carefully tailored to the emotional distress tort than is the truth/falsity
distinction, then the extension of constitutional protection to valueless
speech ought to be less necessary.
The abstract considerations derived from the purpose of constitutionalizing the extreme and outrageous conduct element of the tort
provide some assistance in determining how to set up an acceptable
standard for that element. The law of obscenity offers an analogous
situation in which courts have had to work out a first amendment test
for identifying material that is of no constitutional value. One of the
elements of that test asks "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.,,150 As a recent
decision makes clear, lSI this factor is not to determined by reference to
local community standards. Instead, "[t]he proper inquiry is . . .
whether a reasonable person would find such value in the material,
taken as a whole."152
Drawing on the rationale for constitutional protection of speech,
the nature of the tort claim being asserted, and the precedent in the
obscenity context setting up a blend of local and national standards, a
test for determining whether conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to permit liability to be imposed could be incorporated into the
emotional distress tort. This would separate the constitutionally permissible instances of liability from those situations in which liability
would interfere too greatly with first amendment interests.
The least complicated method of creating such a test simply
would be to supplement the current "extreme and outrageous" com149.
150.
151.
152.

376 u.s. 254, 278-80 (1964).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. IS, 24 (1973).
Pope v. Illinois, \07 S. Ct. 1918 (1987).
[d. at 1921.
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ponent of the Restatement with a lack-of-social-value element. Under
this approach to the issue, the only publication that would satisfy the
test for liability would be a publication which was extreme and outrageous and which lacked serious social value. The introduction of the
social value component as a check on the extreme and outrageous
component serves to distinguish constitutionally valuable "speech that
matters"153 from speech that has no such constitutional value. Phrasing the social value component in the negative, as this test does, carries
with it an obligation for the plaintiff to prove the lack of value, and
thus avoids the imposition of a formal burden of proof on the defendant to justify the publication.
The method of constitutionalization of the emotional distress
claim offered here requires a plaintiff to prove that:
1) the defendant acted with the intent to cause the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress or with recklessness regarding such
harm; and
2) the defendant actually caused severe emotional distress, which
rises to the level of a disabling interference with the plaintiffs normal functioning, and which has been proven by clear and convincing evidence; and
3) the defendant acted in a way that:
a) can be characterized as extreme and outrageous,and
b) either
i) is predominantly speech that is directed to the plaintiff
rather than speech about the plaintiff that is directed to a
wider audience,
or
ii) is speech that lacks serious social value

Using this enriched emotional distress claim, courts can adequately
protect constitutionally valuable speech while still leaving open the
possibility that victims of intentionally inflicted emotional distress are
not precluded from recovery as a result of the introduction of a false
statement of fact element that has no necessary relevance to the tort
action. The revised test for liability offered here suggests that an alternative to the linear depictions of constitutional protection associated
with the Sullivan line of cases (figure 1) and the Fourth Circuit's
Falwell decision (figure 2) can now be drawn. Instead of viewing the
constitution as encouraging all the speech up to a particular dividing
line by extending protection beyond that line, the new test can be portrayed (see figure 3) as involving two circles, one that includes conduct
that is extreme and outrageous, and another that includes speech that
153. See supra note 147.
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has serious social value. In those instances covered by the overlap of
those two circles, the first amendment would be held to prohibit liability, even though all the elements of the emotional distress tort claim
may have been satisfied.
v

FIGURE 3.
The Relationship Between the First Amendment
and the Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress

constitutionally
protected
speech
with serious
social value

conduct
intentionally
inflicting
severe
emotional distress

Depicted in this way, the test demonstrates that the relationship
between the first amendment and the emotional distress claim is coincidental rather than essential. In other words, the Constitution has no
interest whatsoever in the emotionally distressing quality of speech.
What is of concern is the social value attributed to that speech. Viewing the tort claim and the social value of speech as separate spheres
that sometimes overlap depicts the two subjects of the title of this article in their proper relationship. The category of "this kind of speech"
that was before the Court is now properly understood as constituting
"speech with serious social value." For that reason, the speech is entitled to first amendment protection from liability for the infliction of
emotional distress. 154
Application of the conduct element, as constitution ali zed in this
way, to the facts of the Falwell case demonstrates that the Supreme
Court reached the correct result in refusing to allow the plaintiff to
recover. One could conclude that the conduct of the defendants, in
publishing the remarks that went well beyond commentary on the
154. The unsatisfactory nature of the Court's explanations for its construction of categories of
speech is discussed in M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301-10 (1988). The proposal outlined in the text of this article attempts to bring the
publication involved in the Falwell case into a broad category of socially valuable speech, and resists the
noti~n that further subcategorization of "this kind of speech" is likely either to reflect a principled
distinction or to produce a manageable test.
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plaintiff's public and professional life and included allegations of incest
and drunkenness, were so far beyond what is tolerable in a civilized
community as to qualify for the extreme and outrageous characterization. Nevertheless, one could also conclude that the publication has
serious social value on at least two levels. First, the ad parody does
contain political or social commentary on Falwell's public role as a
highly visible proponent of a particular brand of fundamentalist morality. Along with the more highly publicized statements about
Falwell's sexual initiation with his mother, the publication contained
statements purporting to claim that the only way Falwell could preach
the message he put forth was if .he was drunk. The message that
Falwell's preaching is so ridiculous that he could not do it sober is a
commentary on public affairs that ought to be protected by the first
amendment. Second, the ad parody falls into the category of humor.
While it is certainly not to everyone's taste, and goes well beyond the
standard of behavior acceptable in mo~t communities, the ad parody
serves as a vehicle for provoking amusement by deflating the pomposity associated with the plaintiff. For these reasons, even if the plaintiff
were held to have suffered severe emotional distress, the Hustler ad
parody could be located within the overlap of the two circles in Figure
3, and thus protected from liability. '
.
Applying the proposed test to the editorial cartoonist paradigm
case that the Court found so troubling I 55 further demonstrates that the
test has substantial merit as a means of protecting first amendment
value. In most instances, a political cartoon would lie well within the
social value circle and be located wholly outside of the emotional distress circle. However much a particular cartoon might deviate from a
community's standard of decency, as long as the publication had social
value, the plaintiff would be unable to satisfy the burden of proof on
this element. An allegation that a cartoon lacks social value could be
countered by evidence that focuses on such matters as the content of
the cartoon, the overall content and mission of the publication in
which the cartoon appears, and the general pattern of behavior of both
the cartoonist and the publication printing it. That distinction between the creator (e.g., the cartoonist) and the republisher (e.g., the
newspaper) is also important in those instances in which a decision to
sue one but not the other comes into play. Because the newspaper is
likely to have a greater ability to satisfy a judgment, it is a more likely
target of litigation. Under the application of the social value componept of the test proposed here, because of its general social value, a
155. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The cartoonist paradigm reflects the Court's con·
cern that Falwell's recovery would open the door to liability for caustic political speech.
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news or entertainment organization would not face a significant risk of
liability for the publication of a cartoon that otherwise was characterizable as extreme and outrageous in its treatment of the plaintiff.
A final word needs to be said about the absence from the proposed approach of a distinct element dealing explicitly with the public
or private status of the plaintiff. Language in the Falwell opinion suggests that it was the public figure status of the plaintiff combined with
the absence of false statements of fact which produced a privilege to
publish the ad parody. 156 Implicit in such an approach is a belief that
public persons are forced to accept, under all conceivable circumstances, any injury inflicted by any nondefamatory speech. Rather
than recognize a blanket protection for all nondefamatory speech
about public plaintiffs, the position offered in this article suggests that
it would be preferable to incorporate a consideration of the public or
private status of the plaintiff into the determination of whether the
communication about the plaintiff has serious social value. The proposed test for serious social value also tracks the emerging strain in the
Court's defamation precedent that makes constitutional protection
contingent not just on the status of the plaintiff but also on the nature
of the communication. 157 In most instances, the public status of a
plaintiff will weigh heavily toward indicating that the communication
has social value and thus is constitutionally protected. However, by
. incorporating the status factor into the social value determination in
this way, the possibility is left open that there could be a case in which
there is intentionally harmful speech about a public person that does
not fall into the category of "speech that matters"158 or "speech that
involves a matter of public concern."159 Rather than dismiss that case
out of hand by a per se rule of nonliability to public figure or public
official plaintiffs, the revision of the emotional distress action proposed
here is structured in such a way as to leave open the opportunity to
deal with that contingency.
CONCLUSION

This article has put forward a modification of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress that, in the end, produces the
same result that was reached by the Supreme Court in the Falwell
case. The question that probably needs to be answered is-why
156.
officials."
157.
158.
159,

The Court's conclusion is stated as a limitation on 'recovery by "public figures and pU,blic
108 S. Ct. at 882.
See supra note 57.
See supra note 147.
See supra note 57.
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bother? The justification for the approach offered in this article lies in
a belief in the teaching role of the Supreme Court and in a sense that
that role was poorly carried out in Falwell.
Given the decision in Falwell, which rejected liability in the circumstances of that case but provided relatively little guidance for the
resolution of future disputes, there appear to be,Jwo paths that could
plausibly be taken. Proceeding along one path, courts could take a
very expansive approach toward the holding of Falwell and virtually
eliminate the intentional infliction of emotional distress action as an
independent claim for relief. The steps along this path would include
a broad characterization of an emotional distress claim as an illegitimate alternative to a defamation claim, coupled with a widening scope
for the Falwell decision so that the result is an absolute privilege from
all liability for any speech that does not communicate false statements
of fact about a plaintiff.
The other path, the borders of which are sketphed out in this article, would begin with a more careful delineation of precisely why the
speech in the Falwell case is deserving of constitutional protection.
That protection would then be layered on top of the existing elements
of the tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, following the model employed in other speech-tort contexts in the quartercentury since the Sullivan decision. In this way, the emotional distress
claim retains its viability to redress injuries that are inflicted on plaintiffs who ought not to suffer such harm without compensation.
To recap the enriched emotional distress claim that emerges from
the considerations developed in this article, a plaintiff who brings a
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress for conduct
that involves speech should face a more demanding set of elements
than have previously been recognized. For a claim of that sort, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to cause
the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress or with recklessness regarding such harm; that the defendant actually caused severe emotional distress, which rises to the level of a disabling interference with
the plaintiffs normal functioning, and which has been proven by clear
and convincing evidence; and that the defendant acted in a way that
can be characterized as extreme and outrageous, and either is
predominantly speech that is directed to the plaintiff rather than
speech about the plaintiff that is directed to a wider audience, or is
speech that lacks serious social value.
Adopting this enriched approach to the constitutionalization of
the intentional infliction of emotional distress strikes a better balance
between the tort claim and the first amendment than is suggested by
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the Court's treatment of the issue in the Falwell case. Under this approach, all of the elements of the tort claim remain as prerequisites to
liability. Additional showings are required of a plaintiff in order to
prevent the tort claim from having too great a negative effect on first
amendment interests, but those additional elements are tied directly to
the purpose of that constitutional protection rather than grafted from
the defamation context onto the emotional distress claim where they
prove to be inappropriate.
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